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Commentary: Reflections on Decision Research 
and Its Empiricism: Four Comments 
Inspired by Harrison 
Nathaniel T. Wilcox 
Generally I find Harrison's chapter cogent, interesting, and well-informed in details 
and particulars, and so do not speak of them. Instead, I reflect on four larger matters 
Harrison brings to my mind. These four matters are presented below as four separate 
sections, to be read as four separate and short comments ( though the four sections do 
share a few threads). 
1. Intuitions of Theorists 
"In some cases simple, 'agnostic' statistical modeling is appropriate, since the experiment 
'does the work of theory' for the analyst, by controlling for treatments and potential 
confounds:' says Harrison in his introduction. In their manifesto of Bayesian statistics, 
Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) put it in this famously entertaining way: 
It has been called the interocular traumatic test; you know what the data mean 
when the conclusion hits you between the eyes. The interocular traumatic test is 
simple, commands general agreement, and is often applicable; well-conducted 
experiments often come out that way. (217) 
Later Edwards, Lindman, and Savage add that, "The rule was somewhat overstated 
by a physicist who said, 'As long as it takes statistics to find out, I prefer to investigate 
something else (240);"' and Ernest Rutherford allegedly said, "If your experiment 
needs statistics, you ought to do a better experiment:' These are also the sentiments of 
many (perhaps most) decision researchers. I find these sentiments deeply interesting 
and in some respects puzzling. 
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What is the source of those sentiments? Consider these two quotes. 
I am about to build up a highly idealized theory of the behavior of a "rational" 
person ... when certain maxims are presented ... you must ask yourself ... how 
you would react if you noticed yourself violating them. (Savage 1954/1972; 7) 
The following was offered by L. J. Savage as a criticism ... Suppose that a boy 
must select between having a pony x and a bicycle y and that he wavers indecisively 
between them [ the thought experiment is further developed to a telling outcome J 
... If this can happen-and the introspections of several people suggest that it 
can-then the strong binary model is too strong to describe these preferences. 
(Luce and Suppes 1965) 
Theorists may sometimes use their own intuitions (or introspections) as inspiration 
for those "maxims" Savage alludes to above ( today we generally call such maxims 
"axioms"). But I am not a theorist and so hesitate to speak on that matter of private 
inspiration: Instead, I am interested here in the persuasive role played by shared 
intuitions. In their writings, decision theorists reveal that intuitions play two strong 
roles among the theorists. Axioms are the foundation of any formal decision theory, 
and particularly in the case of a normative theory, a theorist frequently appeals to 
another theorist's intuition, as Savage does in the first quote above. A theorist will 
frequently state axioms in two ways: Once mathematically (for formal proofs) 
and once verbally to aid and persuade other theorists' intuitions ( concerning the 
normative status, and/or the likely descriptive validity, of a proposed axiom). Second, 
when a theorist suggests an outcome of her thought experiment and that suggested 
outcome is widely endorsed by other theorists' intuitions, that consensus of intuitions 
becomes convincing evidence concerning some theory, as Luce and Suppes admit in 
the second quote above. Most frequently, such evidence from thought experiments 
is negative, suggesting a counter-example that casts doubt on the descriptive 
adequacy of some theory. The thought experiments are generally presented simply 
and transparently-largely in verbal form, perhaps with a table or two illustrating 
concrete sets of alternatives, but almost never more formally than that (Debreu 1960 
being a notable exception). The purpose is to aid and persuade the reader's intuition 
that the thought experiment indeed leads to outcomes contradicting some theory. In 
both these cases, a consensus of intuitions or intuition consensus is a highly prized 
coin of the decision-theoretic realm. 
If you are very used to persuasion by means of transparent and simple verbal 
descriptions or thought experiments, you may (perhaps unfairly) devalue other less 
transparent kinds of evidence. Many new inferential techniques and demonstration 
methods-widely accepted among either classical or Bayesian statisticians-draw on 
our newfound bounty of computational power. The inferential techniques include 
simulated maximum likelihood, simulation-based Bayesian estimation, and so-called 
"bootstrapping" of the sampling variability of estimates. The primary demonstration 
method is Monte Carlo simulation, a well-established framework for examining 
estimators' behavior in finite samples. Here I share what one theorist said about the 
latter method as used in one of my own papers (Wilcox 2017): 
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I am quite confident that [other scholars I respect] would not be satisfied with 
simulation results for a claim that could perhaps be proved analytically. I am aware 
of the fact that simulations are being extensively used, but I tend to believe that 
people resort to these methods when there is no hope of obtaining an analytical 
result. 
Analytical results on the finite sample behavior of most nonlinear estimators are only 
rarely forthcoming, and only in very simple circumstances. 
For whatever reasons, simulations (computation-based existence demonstrations) 
are a kind of evidence contemporary theorists do not find compelling. I suspect this is 
because simulations don't lend themselves to intuition consensus in the same way the 
normative status of an axiom does, or the negative outcome of a thought experiment 
does (nor is it an analytical proof-which, of course, the theorists find convincing 
too). Presented with flair, a reader can usually grasp the results of a simulation with 
no serious problem. However, if the inferential or demonstration process of simulation 
is not part of your own methodological toolbox, the process remains a kind of black 
box to you. 
I fear that fairly or not, there is only one inferential technique that stands a chance 
of generating intuition consensus among the theorists: It is the interocular trauma 
test, which, by definition, is intuitive-"the conclusion hits you between the eyes:' 
Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) warn that "the enthusiast's interocular trauma 
may be the skeptic's random error. A little arithmetic to verify the extent of the trauma 
can yield great peace of mind for little cost (217):' Simulation-based inferences and 
demonstrations take us well beyond "a little arithmetic:' One might say they are just 
hundreds of millions of instances of "a little arithmetic'' assembled with care, but truly 
such quantity has a nontransparent quality all its own. 
Aside from simulation itself, Harrison's preferred style of statistics (and it is 
mine too) also depends on millions of computations assembled with care: Complex, 
highly nonlinear likelihood functions do11t get maximized without the considerable 
computational muscle of a computer. The output will never have the same transparency 
as a comparison of sample means, or the inspection of other simple sample moments. 
Like Harrison (see in particular his Section 4.5), I have argued that simple sample 
moments can be highly misleading to decision researchers (Wilcox 2008: 224-31; 
Wilcox 2017), but the (apparent) transparency of (potentially misleading) simple 
sample moments seems irresistible. 
2. Estranged Siblings 
Among the decision theorists, McFadden (1974, 1981) arguably had the single 
largest impact on empirical social and behavioral scientists who work with naturally 
occurring "field" data (as opposed to laboratory data): Such field researchers are the 
overwhelming majority of empirical economists. In his Nobel Prize lecture, McFadden 
(2001: 351) prominently recognized nine scholars, very much a mix of decision 
theorists and econometricians: 
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Nine other individuals who played a major role in channeling microeconometrics 
and choice theory toward their modern forms, and had a particularly important 
influence on my own work, are Zvi Griliches, L. L. Thurstone, Jacob Marschak, 
Duncan Luce, Amos Tversky, Danny Kahneman, Moshe Ben-Akiva, Charles 
Manski, and Kenneth Train. 
During those remarkable twenty years from Savage ([1954] 1972) to McFadden 
(1974), a brisk traffic of ideas traveled between the decision theorists and the 
econometricians: For instance, Luce (1959) and Luce and Suppes (1965) are absolutely 
central to McFadden (1974), who additionally cites Block and Marschak (1960) and 
Tversky and Russo (1969). 
In the decades since McFadden (1974), prominent decision theorists such as 
Fishburn (1978) and Machina (1985) also turned their talents to the apparently 
probabilistic nature of discrete binary choice-with no discernable impact on 
econometricians. And in the decades since Manski (1975), econometricians such as 
Cosslett (1983) and Horowitz (1992) turned their own talents to the same subject-
with no discernable impact on decision research. Focus now on two papers published 
a quarter century ago: This gives us plenty of time to see their impact. Busemeyer and 
Townsend ( 1993) is a landmark contribution to probabilistic decision theory: It offers 
a very precise decision-theoretic model of both the econometric link function and 
index function. It is clearly influential with 569 total SSCI (Social Science Citation 
Index) citations, but gets zero citations from theoretical econometricians (though a 
handful of citations from applied econometricians). Published in the same year as 
Busemeyer and Townsend, most would call Klein and Spady (1993) an important 
milestone in econometric theory: It can free the researcher of assumptions concerning 
link functions-at the cost of strong assumptions (but short of linearity, and this was a 
major contribution to semiparametric estimation) concerning index functions. It too 
is clearly influential with 226 total SSCI citations, but just one (Donkers, Melenberg, 
and Van Soest 2001) is a decision research paper and none are decision theory papers. 
The sad truth is that over the quarter century since 1993, these two communities of 
scholars ( the decision researchers and the econometricians) share about as much as the 
Dance and Physics Departments. Those remarkably cross-fertile years from 1954 to 
197 4 are well over: Econometrics and decision research went their very separate ways. 
To see the ways they went, consider the probabilistic model Harrison specifies 
for Expected Utility Theory (EUT) in eq. (4), Pr(R) =f (VEU). This is just a specific 
instance of the more general model Pr ( R) = F(D(R, S j 0) ), where Fis any link function 
and D(R,S I 0) is any theoretical representation of the comparison between lotteries 
R and S-to the econometrician, the index function with parameters 0. It's fair to say 
many econometricians are perfectly happy to require linearity (in the parameters 0) of 
D(R,S I 0): They just want to estimate 0 without assumptions concerning F, the link 
function. From the viewpoint of decision theory, making D(R,S j 0) a linear function 
of 0 essentially takes the Prince of Denmark out of Hamlet: A representation without 
nonlinear entities in D(R,S I 0) just isn't worth discussing or thinking about. It's fair 
to say the decision researchers (Harrison and I, and at least some theorists such as 
Busemeyer and Townsend 1993) are fine with specific assumptions about F, if it buys 
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us the ability to estimate the nonlinear entities in D(R, S j 0) with few extra assumptions. 
So decision researchers and econometricians have found themselves at cross-purposes 
since the days of McFadden and Manski. 
3. All the Horses Are Dead, Long Live the Horse Race 
A decision theory 1: is (usually) an axiom set such as Ar= {At,A{, ... ,A;} generating 
a representation (such as BUT) that applies to some prespecified set Q of lottery 
pairs {R,S}. There are two empirical strategies as regards skepticism concerning such 
theories. The more common strategy takes a narrow focus on one or another of the 
axioms in Ar, over some subset E c 0: Here E is a special slice of .Q, for instance, a 
"common ratio group" of lottery pairs in some experiment designed to interrogate At 
(e.g., the Independence Axiom of BUT). Generally Q is an infinite set, so that special 
slice E is a very small fraction of .Q. When this empirical strategy rejects axiom At on 
subset E, we do learn something important and especially useful to decision theorists 
in the here and now: They may now craft a replacement for At, hopefully leading to an 
improved theory. 
But we need to keep clear that we learned little about the theory's performance 
on the set Q - B. We might be better off with a different sort of experiment: some 
kind of broad sampling of .Q instead of a specially contrived slice of .Q, and then a 
contest between the theories themselves rather than specific axioms. This less common 
empirical strategy (practiced by Harrison, myself and others such as Hey and Orme 
1994) interrogates the collective wisdom of whole axiom sets Ar by means of horse races 
between their representations-generally speaking with a rather less special slice of .Q 
as the experimental pairs. My firm conviction is that every descriptive decision theory 
is a dead horse walking-if we insist on its slaughter should it fail to describe every 
preference over all pairs in .Q for every decision maker. It is much more reasonable 
to race the horses ( the theories, in competition with one another) and ask which 
ones win a noticeable fraction of the races (in other words, best explain the behavior 
of a noticeable fraction of our subjects on broad collections of decision problems). 
Harrison has this in mind when he discusses mixture models. 
From both economic and evolutionary game theory we have good reason to expect 
living populations are mixtures of types ( today this is well known to the point of 
banality). This is a primary reason (among others) why the "hypothetico-deductive'' 
science model has limited usefulness for the empiricism of the biological and social 
sciences. I congratulate physicists for their clever selection of (mostly) the easiest 
possible populations (homogeneous ones) to work with, but someone has to meet the 
theoretical and empirical challenges of mixed populations with deep and pervasive 
heterogeneity. Given those types of populations, simple hypothesis-testing is potentially 
counterproductive. Suppose theory 1:'s axiom AI survives a narrow hypothesis test 
in set B for (say) 70 percent of subjects. But also suppose that in a competitive tests 
against (say) two other theories, on a broad sample of set .Q, theory 1: best accounts for 
the behavior of just 20 percent of the subjects. I have little hesitation saying that the 
former test of axiom AI is at best a distraction and at worst highly misleading. When 
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i';,:if; 
we concentrate on relative success rather than absolute null hypothesis-testing, we're .f 
in a different world of measures of predictive success such as likelihoods, information 
criteria, estimated type shares in the population, and so forth. It is not a world of simple 
sample moments and interocular traumas. 
4. Do as Theorists Say (Not as Empiricists Do) 
"It cannot be said ... that a rational man must behave according to the Bernoulli 
principle;' Allais (1953: 505) concluded in the English Summary of his celebrated 
Econometrica article (in French). As Ellsberg (1961: 646) could have put the argument 
on Allais' behalf, "One could emphasize here ... that the postulates ... faHed to predict 
reflective choices'.' Yet listen in today among the conferees at any decision research 
conference: Most regard "the Bernoulli principle" as definitive of rational decision-
making under uncertainty and, in this and many other ways, we are all Savage's ([1954] 
1972) children. To us, "Allais' Paradox" is a finding that subjects' decision behavior 
violates Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) and is therefore not rational (pace 
Allais and Ellsberg). As Harrison mentions, SEUT has other prominent normative 
Discontents (Loomes and Sugden 1982; Machina 1982; Schmeidler 1989; Epstein 
1992)-Allais and Ellsberg are just the two most familiar names. But if pressed I think 
a majority of the conferees would agree that SEUT is rational choice under uncertainty. 
Savage has other children: Bayesian statisticians (Box and Tiao 1973; Gelman 
et al. 2004), Bayesian econometricians (Zellner 1971; Geweke 2005), and Bayesian 
psychometricians (Kruschke 2011; Lee and Wagenmakers 2014). Edwards, Lindman, 
and Savage (1963) published perhaps the first manifesto of Bayesian statistics, 
contrasting "such procedures as a Bayesian would employ in an article submitted to 
the Journal of Experimental Psychology, say, and those [classical procedures] now 
typically found in that journal (195);" and in concluding said, "Bayesian procedures 
are not merely another tool for the working scientist ... as we saw, evidence that 
leads to classical rejection of the null hypothesis will often leave a Bayesian more 
confident of that same null hypothesis than he was to start with (240):' They squarely 
address the statistical practices of researchers and ofter the new Bayesian alternative 
to those researchers' classical data analysis. They are not talking about modeling 
subject behavior. Yet most citations of the manifesto borrow its mathematical results 
as descriptive models of subject behavior-to be followed, with high likelihood, by 
classical hypothesis-testing using the experiment's data. Uncharitable people might say 
normative hypocrisy has been perfected in decision research: Scholars born of Savage's 
seismic advance ask why subjects don't do as theorists say (not as empiricists do). Just 
a half dozen years ago Matthews (2011: 843) could fairly say "Judgment and decision 
making research overwhelmingly uses null hypothesis significance testing as the basis 
for statistical inference" and ask "What might judgment and decision making research 
be like if we took a Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing?" 
Harrison argues (I think fairly) that decision research does its classical statistics 
with sometimes questionable rigor. But why would decision researchers do classical 
statistics at all, if we really believe that obedience to SEUT and Bayes' Rule is rationality 
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in the face of uncertainty? This question is wholly unoriginal: From conversations, 
I know it nags many other classical empirical economists. But in decision research, 
perhaps this question ought to elicit particularly sheepish grins? Or should we take our 
cues from Emerson and Whitman-not insisting on foolish consistency, and accepting 
that we contain multitudes? These are matters best addressed by philosophers, 
historians, and methodologists. 
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